EMINENT DOMAIN AFTER KELO v.
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COMPENSATING FOR THE
SUPREME COURT’S REFUSAL TO
ENFORCE THE FIFTH AMENDMENT
SCOTT D. MIKKELSEN*

“[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation.”—U.S. Constitution, Amendment V.
Governments, both state and federal, have the right to take
private property for public use, provided that just compensation is
paid.1 The Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution sets the legal
standard for these propositions—this power is known as the right of
2
eminent domain. In the landmark decision, Kelo v. City of New
3
London, the Supreme Court held that the taking of a citizen’s private
property for economic development qualified as a public use within
4
the meaning of the Fifth Amendment. Several scholars, legislatures,
and individuals, have objected to Kelo’s extension of the power of

* 2006 J.D. Candidate, Duke University School of Law.
1. Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2658 n. 1. Governments are prohibited
from taking private property without paying for it by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause. Id. (citing Chicago, B. & Q.R. Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897)). However,
this does not appear strictly correct, since the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause does
not refer either to takings or to compensation, and the manner by which the just compensation
and public use requirement is imposed on the states must be derived from the definition of due
process. See JOHN NOWAK AND RONALD ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §11.11, 426 (4th
ed. 1991)).
2. Nothing in the Constitution explicitly confers this eminent domain power upon either
the federal or state governments. But the Fifth Amendment, originally intended to apply solely
to the federal government, provides that “private property [shall not] be taken for public use,
without just compensation.” Therefore the Taking Clause is at least a “tacit recognition that the
power to take private property exists.” United States v. Carmack, 329 U.S. 230, 241 (1946).
3. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2677 (2005) (O’Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O’Connor noted that
States play many important functions in our system of dual sovereignty, but compensating for
the Supreme Court’s refusal to properly enforce the Federal Constitution is not among them.
4. Id. at 2656–58.
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5
eminent domain because the ruling has extended the government’s
6
power of eminent domain to areas once thought unimaginable.
Instead of critiquing the merits of the majority’s decision, this
commentary will focus on practical applications in a post-Kelo world.
Its purpose is twofold: first, to serve as a guide to individuals and state
legislators assessing what the Kelo decision says, and second, to assist
all individuals attempting to meaningfully protect their Fifth
Amendment rights post-Kelo. Part I is a guide to the facts of the Kelo
case. An understanding of the Kelo facts will allow practitioners to
compare or distinguish future property rights and eminent domain
cases. Following the facts section, Part II covers the legal framework
of the Kelo decision by discussing and analyzing two prior eminent
domain cases relied upon by the Kelo majority and providing an
explanation for the Court’s ultimate expansion of eminent domain
power. Finally, Part III offers suggestions for post-Kelo actions for
which individuals can lobby and legislators can follow to ensure
protection of their constituents’ Fifth Amendment rights.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND OF KELO V. NEW LONDON
By the early 1990’s, the City of New London, Connecticut, already
had experienced decades of economic decline.7 By 1998, the city
witnessed an unemployment rate nearly double that of the rest of the
state, and harbored a dwindling population of just under 24,000
residents, its lowest since 1920.8 These conditions prompted state and
local officials to target New London, particularly its Fort Trumbull

5. Similarly, I disagree with the Supreme Court’s decision in Kelo. The decision ignored
one of the primary purposes of government, to uphold the clearly defined rights of the people,
including the Fifth Amendment’s private property rights. I believe that the Court lost sight of
this primary function by focusing too narrowly on the language from two earlier eminent
domain cases. Regardless, the primary goal of this commentary is not to serve as a theoretical
critique on why the Court was wrong. Many pieces have done that, and perhaps Justice
O’Connor’s and Justice Thomas’ dissents offer the best explanations of the faulty logic
employed by the Kelo majority.
6. See Grassroots Groundswell Grows Against Eminent Domain Abuse,
http://www.ij.org/private_property/connecticut/7_12_05pr.html (last visited May 5, 2006); see
also Eminent Domain Hits the Links, WALL ST. J. EDITORIAL PAGE, Mar. 28, 2006 (the Mayor
of North Hills, New York, said he wants to use powers of eminent domain to turn an elite
private golf course into an elite municipal course, stating, “[it] would be a wonderful amenity for
the people of the village”).
7. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2658.
8. Id.
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9
area, for economic revitalization. To help accomplish economic
revitalization, the New London City Government reactivated the
New London Development Corporation (NLDC), a private nonprofit
entity. In January of 1998, the Connecticut legislature authorized $15
million in bonds to help fund both NLDC’s planning and the creation
of Fort Trumbull State Park.10
In February 1998, Pfizer Inc., the pharmaceuticals manufacturer,
announced that it would build a global research facility near the Fort
Trumbull State Park and the Fort Trumbull residential
11
neighborhood. Two months later, the New London City Council gave
initial approval for the NLDC to prepare the development plan,
12
which later became the subject matter of the Kelo lawsuit. The
development plan provided for the development of ninety acres of
the Fort Trumbull neighborhood, which would complement the
facility Pfizer was planning to build, create jobs, and increase tax and
other revenues.13
The following developments were planned: eighty to one-hundred
new residences; a resort hotel and conference center; a new state park;
and retail, research, and office space.14 The plan divided the area into
seven parcels, but did not specify the exact plans for development in
15
any but the first parcel (the resort and hotel conference center). In
2000, the City approved the development plan and authorized the
corporation to begin acquiring land in the Fort Trumbull
neighborhood.16
The Fort Trumbull neighborhood was composed of 115 residential
and commercial lots, which the NLDC offered to buy. When the
owners of fifteen of the properties did not wish to sell, the City of
17
New London moved to acquire the properties by eminent domain.
The homeowners in question owned properties in a total of just two
18
of the plan’s seven parcels, Parcel 3 and Parcel 4A. Further, the

9. Id. at 2658–59.
10. Id. at 2659.
11. Id. at 2671 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
12. Id. (noting that the NLDC was not elected by popular vote, and its directors and
employees were privately appointed).
13. Id.
14. Id. at 2659 (majority opinion).
15. Id. at 2672 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
16. Id.
17. Id. at 2671–72.
18. Id.
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development plan only called for nominal use of these parcels—for
instance, Parcel 3 was slated for construction of research and office
space as the market progressed for such space, and Parcel 4A was
19
slated for park support.
In response to the City’s efforts, nine of the homeowners sued the
City of New London and the NLDC to save their homes.20 The owners
maintained that the United States Constitution prohibited the NLDC
from condemning their properties for the sake of economic
development, arguing that such development by private developers
was not a public use under the Fifth Amendment.21 At oral argument,
lawyers for the city noted the city’s proposed use for Parcels 3 and 4A
22
was vague, and may be used merely as parking facilities. Despite an
ill defined and unclear conceptualized public use, the city’s argument
23
in favor of public use succeeded.
II. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE KELO CASE
The legal outcome of the Kelo case turned on the question of
whether New London’s economic development plan qualified as a
public use or served a public purpose.24 In Kelo, the Court began by
clarifying two established and opposite public use propositions.25 First,
it was established that a state or local government could not take the
private property of A for the sole purpose of transferring it to another
private party B, even if A was paid just compensation for the
property.26 On the other hand, it was equally clear that a state could
transfer property from one private party to another if future use by
27
the public was the purpose of the taking. The condemnation of land
for a railroad with common-carrier duties is an example of a publicuse taking. Another example is the condemnation of property used

19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 2672.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 2663 (majority opinion). The question of whether public purpose is equivalent to
public use is debatable, but in Kelo, a majority of the Court treated the two terms as
synonymous. At least Justice Thomas disagreed. Id. at 2680 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
25. Id. at 2661 (majority opinion).
26. Id.
27. Id.
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for utility lines or irrigation ditches, all of which are shared by the
28
public.
A. The Berman and Midkiff Cases
Kelo was the first major case the Supreme Court heard involving
the taking of real property by eminent domain since 1984, and only
the second since 1954. Therefore, only two cases from the past fifty
years helped guide the Court in confronting a case that fell
29
somewhere between the two bedrock principles mentioned above. In
order to understand Kelo, it is important to understand these two
decisions.
In 1954, the Supreme Court upheld a redevelopment plan as being
a public use in Berman v. Parker.30 Berman involved a blighted area of
Washington, D.C. in which over half of the housing for the area’s
5,000 inhabitants was beyond repair, and was a threat to public health
and safety.31 The government’s response was to pass the 1945 District
of Columbia Redevelopment Act. Under section 2 of that Act,
Congress declared it the policy of the United States to eliminate all
substandard housing in Washington, D.C. because such areas were
injurious to the public health, safety, morals, and welfare.32 Under
Congress’s plan, the area would be condemned and property taken
through the use of eminent domain so that part of it could be utilized
for the construction of streets, schools, and other public facilities.33 An
owner of a department store located in the blighted area challenged
the condemnation as an invalid public use on two grounds: first, his
property was commercial and not residential or slum housing, and
second, his property was being condemned for sale to a private
agency for redevelopment.34

28. Id. at 2661–64.
29. See Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984) (holding that the Hawaiian
legislature validly exercised its power of eminent domain by taking private property and
granting it to non-landowners, and that such a taking did not violate the public use doctrine);
Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954) (holding that a congressional act condemning blighted
areas in Washington, D.C. and taking them for redevelopment purposes was a valid public use).
30. Berman, 348 U.S. 26.
31. Id. The neighborhood in question had deteriorated from urban blight to the point that
sixty-five percent of the dwellings were beyond repair.
32. NOWAK, supra note 1, at §11.13.
33. Berman, 348 U.S. 26.
34. Id.
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Ultimately the Berman case concerned the constitutionality of the
35
Act, and the use of eminent domain by Congress. A unanimous
Court upheld the Act. It held that once the legislature had determined
that the use of eminent domain was for a public use, the role of the
courts in reviewing the legislature’s judgment was extremely narrow.36
Thirty years later, in 1984, the Court upheld another eminent
domain case involving the taking of private property in Hawaii
37
Housing Authority v. Midkiff. Again, deference to the legislature was
involved in the Court’s reasoning. The Midkiff case involved a scheme
arranged by the Hawaii legislature whereby Hawaii used its eminent
domain power to acquire lots owned by large landowners, and then
transferred the lots to the tenants living on them or to other nonlandowners.38 The facts of the Midkiff case were unusual because of
39
the tremendous inequality in land ownership in Hawaii. For instance,
on the island of Oahu, twenty-two landowners owned 75.5% of the
privately-owned land, forcing thousands of homeowners to lease
rather than to buy the land under their homes.40
These circumstances helped promote social inequality and
41
generated social unrest. By redistributing the property, the problems
attributed to the land oligopoly and deficiencies in the real estate
market could be corrected and a majority of the public would tangibly
and directly benefit from the legislation.42 Importantly, because the
scheme was a rational attempt to remedy a social evil, or correct a
43
public harm, the Court held that it qualified as a public use. In
explaining its decision, the Midkiff Court mentioned the need to give
legislatures broad latitude to determine what public needs justify the
use of the takings power.44

35. NOWAK, supra note 1, at §11.13.
36. Berman, 348 U.S. at 32–33.
37. Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
38. Id. at 233–34.
39. Id. at 233.
40. Id.
41. See id at 241 (noting the Hawaiian legislature’s observation that the state’s land
oligopoly created artificial deterrents to the normal functioning of the market, and thus,
inequality of ownership).
42. NOWAK, supra note 1, at §11.13.
43. Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 241–43.
44. Id. at 244–45; see also Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2664 (upholding
Midkiff).

2007]

EMINENT DOMAIN AFTER KELO V. CITY OF NEW LONDON

17

B. The Kelo Decision
Relying heavily on Berman v. Parker and Hawaii Housing
Authority v. Midkiff, the Connecticut Supreme Court concluded that
the economic development involved in Kelo v. City of New London
constituted a public use under both the Connecticut State
Constitution and the U.S. Constitution.45 The United States Supreme
46
Court affirmed in a 5-4 decision led by Justice Stevens. Early in the
opinion, Justice Stevens turned to Berman and Midkiff and made it
clear that the Supreme Court granted great deference to legislatures
in determining which public needs justified the use of eminent
domain.47 One unifying theme among these three cases is the general
application of deference to state governments, and the evolution of
this deference.
Although Berman and Midkiff deferred to the states to determine
what constitutes public use, Kelo represents the first time the Court
used deference to avoid the constitutional question completely.
Instead, the Court turned deference to legislative judgment into a
threshold question. Thus, the majority gave a disappointing cursory
review to whether the economic development in Kelo qualified as a
public use under the Fifth Amendment.48 The majority took the
position that no principled way existed of distinguishing the Kelo
economic development from the public purposes recognized in
Berman and Midkiff.49 Such a position only left the possibility to grant
the legislature deference and rely on its judgment prior judgment
regarding the taking.
Although the Kelo Court articulated a deferential position to state
governments, the majority also noted three factors that limited its
50
scope of review over the City of New London’s taking. These factors
could be important, as they may not be present in all takings cases.
45. Brett Talley, Restraining Eminent Domain Through Just Compensation: Kelo v. City of
New London, 29 HARV. J. OF L. & PUB. POL’Y 759, 761 (2006).
46. Kelo 125 S. Ct. at 2669.
47. Id. at 2664. It is puzzling that Justice Stevens felt the Fifth Amendment was an area for
strong federalist protection to apply. If the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution is to apply
equally to State governments, it would seem the Federal government would have to be willing
to uphold it against State governments.
48. Justice Kennedy was the fifth and deciding vote. He concurred in the judgment, but
reserved the right to strike down takings that benefit a particular party with only incidental or
pretextual public benefits. Of the four dissenting justices, two wrote separate opinions.
49. Id. at 2665; Talley, supra note 45, at 761.
50. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2665.
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First, New London had invoked a state statute that specifically
authorized the use of eminent domain to promote economic
51
52
development. Second, the statue was comprehensive in character.
Third, the statute had been thoroughly deliberated preceding its
53
adoption. The absence of these factors may be one way to distinguish
future cases from Kelo.
The dissent, written by Justice O’Connor and joined by Justices
Rehnquist, Scalia, and Thomas, distinguished Kelo from Berman and
Midkiff, pointing out that both cases involved takings that were
effected to remedy extraordinary situations that had inflicted
54
affirmative harm to the public. There was no infliction of affirmative
harm occurring in New London, however, and by authorizing the
condemnation of well maintained property for the sole purpose of
generating economic development the dissent stated that, “the Court
has so greatly expanded the definition of public use that it now
includes virtually all exercises of eminent domain.”55 Further, the
dissent pointed out that nearly all takings benefit the public in some
56
way. Because large private companies could use private property in a
more lucrative way, the majority’s reasoning would create a standard
57
under which no private property would be truly safe.
Justice Thomas also wrote a separate dissenting opinion. He
agreed with Justice O’Connor’s opinion in that by approving
economic development as a public use, the Court was effectively
removing any constitutional impediment to the use of eminent
58
domain. Justice Thomas went further, however, and encouraged
revisiting the Public Use Clause cases and returning to the original
meaning of the Public Use Clause: that the government may take
property only if it actually uses or gives the public a legal right to use
59
the property.
The other fundamental position and critical distinction Justice
Thomas highlighted was the Court’s confusion and error in equating

51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2674 –75 (O’Connor, J., dissenting); Talley, supra note 45, at 763.
Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2674–75 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2686 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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the power of eminent domain with the police power of the States.
Justice Thomas traced this confusion to the following statement the
Supreme Court made in the Midkiff decision: “the public use
requirement is conterminous with the scope of a sovereign’s police
61
powers.” Justice Thomas pointed out that these two powers are not
the same. For example, traditional uses of the police or regulatory
power of States, such as the power to abate a nuisance, does not
require compensation, as does the use of eminent domain.62
Whether a State can take private property using the power of
eminent domain, Justice Thomas argued, is distinct from the question
63
of whether it can regulate property pursuant to the police power.
Even Berman would have been decided on different grounds had
these distinct lines been drawn.64 Under Thomas’s view, if the slums in
Berman were truly blighted, then the state nuisance laws, not the
power of eminent domain, should have provided the appropriate
remedy.65
Despite the dissents, the Kelo decision presently affirms the use of
eminent domain for economic development. Thus, we arrive at the
best way to proceed post-Kelo.
III. WHAT ACTION TO TAKE POST KELO
After the Kelo v. City of New London decision, it has become
clear that the protection of the Fifth Amendment is now in the hands
66
of state governments. The Supreme Court itself has clearly stated
that federal courts will defer to state legislatures in their
determination of what constitutes a public use in the area of eminent
domain.67 This is the common thread linking fifty years of Court
jurisprudence, stretching from the Berman decision to the Kelo

60. Id. at 2685. This was also a concern Justice O’Connor shared at some level. See Talley,
supra note 45, at 763.
61. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2685 (Thomas, J., dissenting); Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467
U.S. 229, 240 (1984).
62. Kelo, 125 S.Ct at 2685 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
63. Id. (citing Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1014 (1992)).
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2668 (majority opnion) (“We emphasize that nothing in our opinion
precludes any State from placing further restrictions on its exercise of the takings power.”).
67. Id.; Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 244–45 (1984); Berman v. Parker, 348
U.S. 26, 32–33 (1954).
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68
decision. The seminal event was reached in Kelo, when the majority
instructed states to strengthen their own property rights if they were
69
dissatisfied with the decision. Now, a proper legislative response
should consider three things: (1) clearly defining the difference
between a state’s regulatory or police power, and its eminent domain
power; (2) clearly defining what qualifies as a public use under
eminent domain; and (3) creating a property rights ombudsman
office.70

A. Clearly Define the Difference Between State Regulatory Power
and State Eminent Domain Power
One of the most important steps a legislature can take to
compensate for the Kelo v. City of New London decision is to draft
legislation that makes clear the distinction between its state’s
regulatory or police power, and its eminent domain power. The
purpose of the police power is to secure rights by prohibiting harms,71
while the purpose of the eminent domain power is to provide public
goods by taking private property, but only after paying the owner just
compensation.72 Therefore, it may be said that the state takes property
by eminent domain when it is useful to the public, and the state takes
73
property under the police power when it is harmful. Thus, a
legislature may clarify that its state’s police power will be used to
solve nuisance-type problems and prohibit harms, and reserve
eminent domain power to situations that provide a public use or
public good.74
Circumstances that fit into neither a state’s police power nor
75
eminent domain power should be reserved for the individual. This is
an important and balanced provision, as it keeps individual property

68. Id.
69. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2668.
70. An ombudsman is an official of government who assists citizens in resolving disputes
with the government.
71. Steven Eagle, The Birth of the Property Rights Movement, THE CATO INSTITUTE,
http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa404.pdf (last visited May 5, 2006).
72. Id.
73. Id. (quoting Ernst Freund, The Police Power: Public Policy and Constitutional Rights
(Buffalo, N.Y.: William S. Hein, 1904), § 511. Quoted in Zev Trachtenberg, “Introduction: How
Can Property Be Political?” 304 OKLA. L. REV. 50 (1997)).
74. See Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2685 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (noting that such a distinction
would mean that the Berman decision would have been decided on different grounds).
75. Id. at 2680.
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owner’s rights intact, while still allowing municipalities to fight
76
problems that create public harms. Cities, states, and legislators have
many options when confronting eminent domain issues, and they
represent a large continuum of responses, many of which need not
trample individual property rights to be successful.
In this regard, it is important for legislators and advocates to not
engage in a debate that sets up a false dichotomy between economic
development and strong property rights. For evidence of this
77
proposition, it is worth examining the City of Anaheim, California.
Anaheim’s old downtown had been obliterated in the 1970s by
eminent domain for urban renewal, which was unsuccessful and costly
78
to the taxpayers. When recently faced with economic and city
redevelopment, instead of trying eminent domain again, the city
79
pursued deregulation. By forming an overlay zone that removed
zoning restrictions and allowed almost any imaginable use of the
downtown property, the city created a land value premium in the
dilapidated area. Because owners could suddenly sell to a wider range
of buyers, the area boomed, resulting in the investment of billions of
dollars. In short, Anaheim succeeded in protecting property rights by
deregulating land uses and promoting competition.80
B. Clearly Define What Qualifies as a Public Use or Purpose
Second, a proper legislative response should clearly define what
qualifies as a public use. There are only two constitutional
requirements for the exercise of eminent domain power: that the use
be public, and that the owner receive just compensation.81 The most
straightforward manner in which to compensate for the Kelo v. City of
New London decision is to draft legislation that clearly explains that
economic development does not constitute a public use in a state.

76. It is important to note, however, that the use of regulatory power usually does not
require the state to compensate individuals to remove a nuisance; consider if you want to
compensate such individuals in your state.
77. The
Anti-Kelo,
WALL
ST.
J.
EDITORIAL
PAGE,
Apr.
6,
2006.
http://www.opinionjournal.com/cc/?id=110008189 (last visited May 5, 2006).
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Talley, supra note 45, at 759.
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C. Consider Establishing Ombudsman Offices
Finally, a proper legislative response to Kelo v. City of New
London would be to establish a property-rights ombudsman office
within your state. A property-rights ombudsman office could be
available to individuals when they are confronting a condemnation by
the government and trying to assess whether the government’s
proposed use fits the definition of a public use, or whether the
government’s valuation of its property is fair and accurate.82 An
ombudsman could also encourage state and local government
agencies to regulate and acquire land in a manner that is consistent
with applicable statutes and laws.
An ombudsman office is important because the burden of
eminent domain falls disproportionately on the poor, and the poor are
83
the least likely to be able to afford legal assistance. This is especially
true when individuals want to contest whether a proposed eminent
domain action fits the definition of a public use, because there is no
guaranteed monetary value to attract legal assistance on a contingent
fee basis. A state can help solve this problem by making a propertyrights ombudsman available to all individuals, which some states
already do.84
IV. CONCLUSION
Post Kelo v. City of New London, it is necessary for individuals
and state legislators to realize that the protection of Fifth Amendment
rights is now in their hands. I have detailed three steps states can take
to help ensure the protection of these rights. Undoubtedly, there are
other steps states can take. Even though the Supreme Court upheld
the Connecticut Supreme Court’s decision in Kelo, there is no reason

82. Although the Kelo decision focused on the public use clause, the just compensation
clause could also be considered when drafting a legislative response to Kelo. See Talley, supra
note 45, at 760–68. Evidence suggests typical fair market values under-compensate homeowners
displaced by eminent domain; the Supreme Court has even admitted this problem exists. United
States v. 564.54 Acres of Land, 414 U.S. 506 (1979); Talley, supra note 50, at 766 (citing James
G. Durham, Efficient Just Compensation as a Limit on Eminent Domain, 69 MINN. L. REV.
1277, 1305 (1985). For an illustration of this phenomenon, look no further than the valuation
figures currently estimated for the Deepdale golf course in New York mentioned at the
beginning of this commentary; the county assessor’s valuation figure was around $13 million, the
club insisted it was worth more than $100 million.
83. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2677. (O’Connor, J. dissenting); Id. at 2687. (Thomas, J. dissenting).
84. For instance, Utah already has a Property Rights Ombudsman office.
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why legislatures cannot take steps to protect the Fifth Amendment
private property rights of their citizens in a meaningful way.

